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When asset values fall, the owners of collateralized loans are not in an enviable position.  Nonetheless,
they possess a kind of monopoly power over their borrowers that they do not possess when borrowers
are solvent.  Lenders maximize profits by price discriminating, but create deadweight costs in the process.
From the perspective of the aggregate labor market, it is as if lenders were levying their own labor
income tax, on top of the taxes already levied by public treasuries.  Governments have an incentive
to regulate this price discrimination, repudiate part of the private debts, cut their own tax rates, or acquire
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  By some measures, housing prices have fallen by a third since 2006 and are 
forecast to fall further.  As a result, many home mortgage amounts significantly exceed 
the value of the collateral – perhaps by an aggregate amount as much as $1 trillion.  The 
housing turmoil has wealth effects and the price crash curtails residential construction 
while reducing investment goods prices and encouraging nonresidential investment 
(Mulligan and Threinen, 2008).  But the settlement of the mortgage claims themselves 
may have further effects on the economy; investigating that settlement is the purpose of 
this paper. 
Debt obligations can sometimes exceed a borrower’s capacity to pay, in which 
case he may not have an incentive to produce income that can be seized by the lender.  
Debt forgiveness can make both borrower and lender better off.  This problem of debt 
overhang has been widely recognized in the context of sovereign debt (Sachs, 1990), and 
has been applied to consumer debt as well.  I extend the standard collateralized debt 
overhang model to include multiple and heterogeneous borrowers, and then work out 
some aggregate implications for the labor market. 
Debt overhang has something like a social multiplier.  When collateral is 
valuable, only a few borrowers will not pay their loans in full.  Lenders can restructure 
debt for those few without much consequence for its other borrowers.  As collateral 
values fall, the worst-off borrowers cannot be forgiven as easily, because that forgiveness 
provides bad incentives for the others.  As collateral values fall in the wider economy, the 
worst off borrowers have increasingly bad incentives to earn income.  Sachs (1990, p. 22) 
discusses a related problem of “precedent” in the country context – that a bank may 
negotiate with a country with an eye toward future negotiations with other countries.  In 
my model, a bank negotiates with an individual borrower with an eye toward its effect on   2
negotiations with other borrowers, but the connections among borrowers are merely the 
incentive compatibility constraints that are like those faced by public treasuries. 
From an aggregate point of view, low collateral values create high tax rates on 
labor income, but these taxes do not go to the Treasury – they go to the lenders.  Indeed, 
the Treasury loses tax revenue from lender efforts to recoup some of their principal.  That 
is, lender and Treasury taxation interact with each other – lenders’ incentive to tax rises 
with the Treasury’s tax rate. 
Fisher (1933), Mishkin (1978), and Bernanke and Gertler (1983), Kroszner (1999) 
and others have noted that household balance sheets seem to be correlated with the 
business cycle and have offered theoretical interpretations of this correlation.  However, 
their models operate on an investment or intertemporal margin, whereas my model 
operates on the consumption-leisure margin.  In my approach, credit markets could be 
functioning well in that new loans permit intertemporal margin rates of substitution to 
equal the marginal product of capital; employment suffers merely because current income 
is a criterion for the forgiveness of prior debts.  The problem is the settlement of old 
loans, not the intermediation of new ones. 
  Section I begins with a simple model of debt overhang and lender profit 
maximizing debt forgiveness, in which borrowers differ in their willingness to repay and 
that willingness is only imperfectly observed by the lender.  As collateral values fall, a 
larger fraction of borrowers consider paying less than the full amount and the lender 
optimally discriminates among them according to income, employment status, and other 
indicators of the willingness to pay.  This discriminating debt forgiveness distorts 
borrower behavior much like a labor income tax or an unemployment insurance program 
would. 
  Section II shows that prior business cycles – especially the Great Depression – 
have exhibited labor supply distortions that have usually been interpreted as “mysterious” 
in the sense that they look like they could have been created by counter-cyclical taxes, 
except that actual taxes paid to the public treasury were not so counter-cyclical.  I offer a 
new interpretation of those mysterious distortions – some of them may be the distortions 
created by private debt collection.   3
Section III considers the interactions of the mortgage debt forgiveness with labor 
income taxes paid to the public treasury.  Even a tax (to the public treasury) paid by a 
minority of persons can distort the labor supply of persons not paying the tax because of 
its impact on lenders’ debt collection strategies.  Section IV concludes. 
 
 
I.  A Simple Model of Debt Forgiveness and Labor Market Distortions 
I.A.  Debt Forgiveness as Mechanism Design 
  Each individual of a group of ex ante identical borrowers obtains a collateralized 
loan.  Initially, the value of the collateral exceeds the amount lent.  Some time after the 
beginning of the loan, but before its final payment, the borrowers experience a common 
change in their collateral value.  Of particular interest is the case in which collateral 
values fall: the each loan now has par value that exceeds the value of collateral by b.  In 
addition, each borrower has a received an idiosyncratic shock to his privately observed 
labor productivity: half have productivity wL and the other half have productivity wH > 
wL.  nL and nH denote the work effort by the low and high types, respectively.  Each 
individual produces the product of his effort and his productivity.  Each individual has a 
utility function u(c,n) defined over consumption c and work effort n.  Consumption and 
leisure are assumed to be normal goods in the sense that c rises and n falls when utility 
rises for a fixed marginal rate of substitution. 
Borrowers have the option of declaring bankruptcy or inviting foreclosure.  After 
a borrower has exercised this option, he works the efficient amount and looses a lump 
sum  () Tw that increases with his true productivity.  The lump sum loss can be 
interpreted as time and resources spent on bankruptcy proceedings, psychic costs, or lost 
access to credit. 
There is a positive repayment amount, but less than b and  () Tw that is mutually 
preferred to foreclosure by both the borrower and the lender.  If the lender knew the 
borrower’s type, he could insist on a payment just a penny less than  () Tw – backed up 
with the threat of foreclosure.  The borrower would make the payment because it is less 
than foreclosure costs him.  However, I assume that borrower type w is not observed by 
the creditor.   4
I assume that borrowers’ various creditors have a clear seniority, so that creditors 
do not compete with each other to obtain repayment.  Thus, once the collateral value has 
fallen below loan par, the senior creditor has a kind of monopoly power vis-à-vis his 
borrowers.  The creditor may not succeed in obtaining full payment for the loan, but he 
still seeks to maximize the total repayments received.  Denoting as TL and TH the 
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where α and β are constants. 
Ignoring for the moment the second term in each of the braces {}, the first 
constraint requires that the high type prefer the repayment offered to, and income 
required by, self-declared high types to those offered to self-declared low types.   The 
second constraint requires that the low type prefer what is offered low types.  These two 
incentive compatibility constraints are just as those specified in the Mirrlees (1971) 
optimal tax problem.  As in that case, weak conditions on the utility function ensure that 
the second incentive compatibility constraint does not bind. 
The second term in each of the braces {} creates a “participation constraint.”  
That is, the creditor must offer to forgive enough of the debt that the borrower prefers to 
repay the rest rather than declaring bankruptcy or inviting foreclosure.  As indicated, the 
outside option depends on the cost of foreclosure  () Tw.  The last pair of constraints says 
that the lender cannot collect more than the par value of the loan.   
The full information solution (that is, the solution without incentive constraints) 
has both types working the efficient amount and paying the minimum of b and the   5
foreclosure cost.  If that cost did not vary by type, then the efficient solution would be 
incentive compatible because the payment is independent of the labor supply decision. 
  However, unemployed or otherwise unproductive persons may have less to lose 
from bankruptcy, in which case the efficient solution may not be incentive compatible.  
That is, a productive person may benefit by reducing his income and receiving the more 
generous loan forgiveness given to unproductive persons.  In terms of the parameters of 
the model above, this means that β > 0.  In order to characterize solutions to this version 
of the problem, and to apply it to recent events, it is helpful to consider comparative 
statics with respect to the parameter b – the amount by which the loan’s par value 
exceeds the value of collateral – ranging from 0 to values large enough that both types 
consider foreclosure. 
 
I.B.  Zone I: Full Repayment 
 If  b is less than  () L Tw , then the creditor can obtain full repayment from both 
types by insisting on it, with the threat of foreclosing if a borrower fails to pay.  All 
borrowers will repay because their foreclosure cost is greater than the amount owed.  
Borrowers cannot affect the amount of their payment by adjusting their work effort, so 
they work the efficient amount.  The lender is unaffected by a marginal change in 
collateral. 
  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate some of the results.  Each Figure has b on the horizontal 
axis.  Figure 1’s vertical axis measures outcomes for the low type: implicit marginal tax 
rate (that is, the percentage difference between marginal rate of substitution and 
productivity), labor supply, repayment, and write-offs.  Figure 2 displays the outcomes 
for the high type.  Both types have a zero marginal tax in Zone I; they work the efficient 
amount.  For the purposes of illustration, leisure is assumed to be a normal good so that 
work effort rises with b in Zone I.
2 
 
                                                 
2 The wealth effects are best interpreted in relative terms (high type versus low type), because T may be 
offset by other items on borrowers’ balance sheets.  For example, borrowers may also be bank shareholders 
or anticipate purchasing additional collateral in the future (see Buiter, 2008, and Mulligan, 2008, for more 
on this issue).   6
I.C.  Zone II: Efficient Means-Tested Forgiveness 
 For  b slightly larger than  () L Tw , the creditor does not ask for full repayment 
from the low type, because otherwise the low type would choose foreclosure.  The low 
type just pays  () L Tw .  The high type still repays in full, because from his perspective it is 
not worth cutting labor supply so much as to earn wLnL, merely in order to be granted the 
forgiveness b -  () L Tw .  The forgiveness b -  () L Tw  is small by definition of the Zone II, 
but the required change in labor supply to obtain the forgiveness is discrete.  In this Zone, 
the low type is unaffected by b.  The high type’s repayment continues to be b. 
  Outcomes in this zone can be implemented with a means test.  Namely debt is 
forgiven in the amount b -  () L Tw  for anyone who earns less than or equal to wLnL, where 
nL is the efficient labor for a low type making a repayment in the amount  () L Tw .  High 
types do not ask for the forgiveness because they prefer not to pass the means test.  The 
low type does not have to change his behavior in order to pass the means test.
3 
  Low type forgiveness increases one-for-one with b in Zone II.  A reduction in the 
aggregate value of collateral does not affect the low type, but is rather split between the 
lender (who pays for the low type’s loss) and the high type (who pays his own).  One 
empirical test of whether the economy is in Zone I or some other Zone is whether lenders 
loan value depends on the value of collateral.  Given the massive loan write offs by 
lenders in 2007 and 2008, Zone I will not be an adequate description of today’s 
conditions. 
 
I.D.  Zone III: Rising Tax Distortion 
  Suppose for the moment that  () H Tw  were enough greater than  () L Tw  that the 
high type is willing to cut his labor supply to earn wLnL in order to be forgiven 
() () H L Tw Tw − .  Then there is some  ( ) ˆ () , () LH bT w T w ∈  that makes the high type 
indifferent between passing the means test and repaying  ˆ b  in full.
4  For  () ˆ,( ) H bb T w ∈ , 
                                                 
3 For more exposition of the implementation of Mirrlees-optimal taxes with means tests, see Salanie (2003). 
4  ˆ b  is defined implicitly by  ˆ (, ) (( ) , / ) H HH L L L L L H uwn bn uwn Tw wn w −≡ − , where nL and nH 
denote the efficient labor for the low and high type, respectively.   7
the lender has to decide whether he wants to also forgive the high type some amount or 
strengthen the means test (that is, reduce the income threshold beyond which full 
payment is demanded) so that the high type can still be induced to pay in full.  I refer to 
() ˆ,( ) H bb T w ∈  as Zone III. 
  In Zone III, the three potentially binding constraints are (i) the high type’s 
incentive constraint, (ii) the low type’s participation constraint, and (iii) the constraint 
that the high type cannot be forced to pay more than he owes.  In this case, the 
Lagrangian for the debt collection problem is: 
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where λH, λL, and λb are Lagrange multipliers.  Under the usual assumption that the high 
type’s marginal utility of consumption is lower when he earns wHnH rather than wLnL, a 
revenue neutral reduction in the high type’s payment will tighten the incentive constraint 
and is therefore not optimal; TH = b. 
Clearly, the first order condition for high type effort equates the high type’s 
marginal rate of substitution to his productivity; optimal tax rate is zero at the top as in 
Mirrlees (1971).  Thus, in order to make the high type willing to work the efficient 
amount, the creditor optimally strengthens the means test by reducing nL below his 
efficient amount.
5  Because the low type has the option to pay nothing and pay the 
foreclosure cost, strengthening the means test requires reducing the payment owed by the 
low type. 
  One measure of the strength of the means test is the “marginal tax rate” or the 
percentage by which the low type’s marginal rate of substitution is below his 
productivity.  In Zone II, the low type’s marginal tax rate is zero.  In Zone III, the low 
type’s marginal tax rate is positive and, assuming that the wealth effect of b on the high 
type is not too strong, increases with b.  Labor supply falls with b because utility is 
                                                 
5 In terms of the lagrangian, low type effort enters both low type utility and the incentive constraint.  If low 
type utility were the only consideration, low type effort would be efficient.  Because low type effort also 
tightens the incentive constraint, optimal low type effort is less than the efficient amount.   8
constant (recall the participation constraint) and the marginal rate of substitution is 
falling. 
Low type debt forgiveness increases even faster than b.  One empirical test of 
whether the economy is in Zone III (or IV) rather than Zone II is the degree to which 
reductions in collateral value affect the market value of loans.  If the market value of 
loans falls by more than the value of collateral (or more than the value of collateral times 
the fraction of loans made to persons not paying in full), then Zone III (or IV) better 
describes the situation.  This is a basic implication of the model: the amount of departure 
between combined borrower-lender value and the value of collateral indicates the amount 
of inefficiency. 
 
I.E.  Zone IV: Lenders Own All of the Collateral at the Margin 
  The lender cannot ask the high type to pay back more than  () H Tw , so b greater 
than this amount is written off for both low and high types.  Borrower behavior and 
marginal tax rates are the same throughout Zone IV as at the border with Zone III.  The 
lender owns all of the collateral at the margin; aggregate loan value varies one-for-one 
with aggregate collateral value.  With a caveat mentioned below. Zone IV has a labor 
supply distortion for the low type, but does not grow with b as it did in Zone III. 
Zone III might not exist if  () H Tw  is too close to  () L Tw .  If so, there is no labor 
supply distortion for any b, and only a small range of b in which the low type is forgiven 
but the high type is not. 
 
I.F.  Expectations-Augmented Philips Curve and the Consumption-Leisure Ratio 
Obviously, lenders consider the expected future value of collateral when they 
make a loan and intend the amount loaned would, with significant probability, be less 
than the value of collateral.  If collateral values are expected to rise, more can be lent.  In 
other words, the gap between loan amount and collateral values b is positive only 
sometimes – when collateral values are significantly less than expected.  Let μ denote the 
amount by which the collateral value is expected to exceed the amount lent.  At the time 
of the initial loan, the expected b is -μ.  The shock -μ-b is the “unexpected collateral 
value inflation:” the amount by which collateral values are surprisingly high.  Because   9
the marginal tax rate is a function of b, the marginal tax rate is a function of the shock 
-μ-b to collateral values.  Figure 3 graphs the marginal tax rate as a function unexpected 
collateral inflation.  The marginal tax rate is zero over a wide range of shocks, and is 
positive for the most negative shocks.  
Figure 3 is a kind of expectations-augmented Philips curve.  It has unexpected 
collateral value inflation on one axis.  For fixed w and c, the vertical axis is 
monotonically increasing in leisure.  Interestingly, this expectations-augmented Philips 
curve says that, for most outcomes, unexpected inflation does not affect leisure.   
Moreover, even for the more negative shocks, it is not money growth or consumer price 
inflation per se that reduces leisure, but rather collateral value inflation. 
  Since Barro and King (1984), much of macroeconomics research has used 
something like the consumption-leisure ratio to study business cycles in the labor market, 
rather than a Philips curve.  My empirical work follows the Barro and King tradition.  Let 
MRS(c,n) denote the marginal rate of substitution function implied by the utility function 
u(c,n).  Because consumption and leisure are normal goods, MRS rises with c and n.  It 
follows that c and n move in the same direction when the marginal tax rate changes for a 
given productivity w (Barro and King, 1984).  Moreover, with a particular functional 
form for MRS, the effect of the marginal tax rate on the relationship between c, n, and w 
can be quantified.  For the purposes of illustration, I use the marginal rate of substitution 
function γc/(1-n), where c is aggregate real consumption expenditure per adult, n is total 
work hours per adult per 16 hour day,
6 and γ > 0 is a constant.  With this function, the 
ratio  c/[w(1-n)] of aggregate consumption expenditure to leisure expenditure is 
proportional to one minus the marginal tax rate, where the constant of proportionality is γ 
(the budget share from the utility function). 
When collateral values fall enough, b exceeds  ˆ b  and the marginal tax rate for the 
low type becomes positive and rising with b.  The marginal tax rate for the high type is 
zero, so the average marginal tax rate becomes positive and rises with b when b exceeds 
ˆ b .  That is, when collateral values fall enough, they will reduce the ratio c/[w(1-n)] of 
aggregate consumption expenditure to leisure expenditure. 
                                                 
6 For sensitivity analysis with respect to the functional form and measurement of the aggregate time series, 
see Mulligan (2002).   10
 
II. Aggregate Evidence on Labor Market Distortions over Time 
It is well known that the ratio of aggregate consumption expenditure to leisure 
expenditure is pro-cyclical.  Hall (1997) describes the fluctuations in the ratio as 
preference shifts.
7  Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003) interpret the fluctuations as 
evidence of imperfections in the labor market such as nominal rigidities.  Mulligan (2002, 
2005) attempts, with only a little success, to attribute the fluctuations to labor union 
distortions and public policy distortions such as taxes and regulation. 
 
II.A.  Labor Market Distortions during the Great Depression 
The Great Depression and World War II are two of the most dramatic instances of 
changes in the consumption-leisure expenditure ratio, and the difficulty with explaining 
those changes.  In order to consider changes in the ratio in units of marginal tax rates, 
Figure 4’s solid series graphs one minus γ (the budget share from the utility function) 
times the consumption-leisure expenditure ratio, with some adjustments made during the 
war years to reflect output mis-measurement and the involuntary nature of wartime 
military labor supply (see Mulligan, 2005, p. 910).  The solid series was high during the 
Depression and low during World War II. 
If preferences were stable and labor income taxes were the only distortion on the 
consumption-leisure margin, Figure 4’s series would follow the marginal labor income 
tax rate.  However, in fact labor income taxes levied by the U.S. Treasury actually 
changed in the other direction, as shown by Figure 4’s dashed series.  For example, there 
was no payroll tax for much of the 1930s and hardly anyone paid federal individual 
income tax until World War II.  The largest increases in the marginal individual income 
tax rate in U.S. history occurred at the beginning of World War II, and some of the 
largest cuts occurred at the end of the war. 
 
                                                 
7 Hall’s characterization is not always taken literally – rather, that the lesson from Hall is that MRS = 
productivity does not adequately model the business cycle.   11
II.B.  Household Debt during the Great Depression 
So far no one has explained why the consumption-leisure ratio – an aggregate 
indicator of the marginal rate of substitution – would depart from the productivity of 
labor so much in the 1930s, and then depart again in the other direction in the 1940s.  
Cole and Ohanian (2004) attribute some of the persistence of the Great Depression’s low 
consumption-leisure expenditure ratio to an increase in union power and labor market 
regulation.
8  Based the weak assumption that Cole and Ohanian’s story only explains part 
of what happened during the Great Depression, my purpose here is to suggest the 
possibility that debt forgiveness may explain another part.  
Bernanke (1983, p. 260) describes some of the key debt market events in the 
1930s: 
“Given that debt contracts were written in nominal terms, the protracted fall in 
prices and money incomes greatly increased debt burdens.  According to Evans Clark 
(1933), the ratio of debt service to national income went from 9 percent in 1939 to 19.8 
percent in 1932-33.  … about half of all residential properties were mortgaged at the 
beginning of the Great Depression ….  At the beginning of 1933, owners of 45 percent of 
all U.S. farms, holding 52 percent of the value of farm mortgage debt, were delinquent in 
payments.” 
 
Thus, in the 1930s many borrowers owed more on their loans than their collateral was 
worth.  More research is needed to determine how often 1930s creditors means-tested 
their debt forgiveness.  To the degree that it occurred, work incentives were diluted. 
 
 
III. Trickle Down and Up: Interactions Between Public and Private Taxation 
The highest marginal income tax rate increased dramatically in 1932.   
Depression-era policies, such as the creation of the National Labor Relations Board, 
strengthened unions (Cole and Ohanian, 2007) and resulted in quite a large “union wage 
effect” (Lewis, 1963).  Although income taxes and monopoly unionism can create 
distortions on the consumption-leisure margin, some economists have been skeptical of 
                                                 
8 This may be part of the story, although Mulligan (2005) points out that the vast majority of 1930s workers 
were not union members and not covered by the suspect regulations.  Moreover, union density (the fraction 
of workers who are union members) increased dramatically during World War II, which in theory would 
exacerbate the Great Depression ratio or at least allow it to be constant in the face of a reduced distortion 
per union member.   12
the quantitative importance of these particular examples because most people paid no 
income tax during the 1930s (Mulligan, 1998; also notice the dashed line in Figure 4 
above is near zero during those years) and most workers were not union members during 
the 1930s (Mulligan, 2005).  However, the debt overhang model implies that the 
consumption-leisure distortions created by debt collection depend on outside conditions, 
and therefore on the amount and type of redistribution done by the public sector. 
To see this, consider Zones III and IV in which the equilibrium is defined by the 
incentive constraint for the high type and the participation constraint for the low type: 
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where vH(b) is the high type utility when he pays back b.  cL denotes consumption for the 
low type.  Zone IV is defined by  () H bT w = . 
  Now consider a redistributive public policy that raises  L u  and lowers vH, but does 
not change the ratio wL/wH (equivalently, would not affect the proportional change in 
work effort required for the high type to mimic the low type’s labor product).  This 
comparative static can represent, for example, a flat-rate labor income tax used to finance 
a lump sum transfer.  Because the high type earns more than average, this tax and transfer 
would lower vH, even though it might also reduce the amount of resources the high type 
might expect to loose if he invited foreclosure. 
Under weak conditions on the utility function, both the increase in  L u  and the 
reduction in vH serve to raise the marginal tax rate on the low type.  Debt collectors must 
respond to public sector redistribution from high type to low type by strengthening the 
means test, because the high types are more tempted to pass a given means test when the 
public sector is redistributing. 
 
 
   13
IV. Conclusions 
When asset values fall, the owners of collateralized loans are not in an enviable 
position.  Nonetheless, they possess a kind of monopoly power over their borrowers that 
they do not possess when borrowers are solvent.  Lenders maximize profits by price 
discriminating, but create deadweight costs in the process.  One way debt collectors 
discriminate is to ask borrowers with more income to pay more.  This creates an 
expectations-augmented Philips curve: over a wide range, surprises to collateral value 
have no effect (via mortgage forgiveness) on work incentives, but surprises that are bad 
enough reduce the equilibrium incentive to work and thereby increase the amount of 
nonemployment. 
  Although there are many differences between today and the 1930s, one common 
element is the pervasiveness of mortgage obligations that exceed the value of collateral.  I 
am not aware of market-wide measures of either modern or 1930s bank policies for 
forgiving loans.  However, during the time of writing this paper, Citigroup announced a 
plan for reducing borrower payment obligations: 
“[Citigroup] added that it recently streamlined its loan modification program to rework 
delinquent loans. This revamped program uses a simplified formula to figure out an 
affordable payment as a percentage of the borrower's gross income. It then reduces the 
monthly payment to that amount by either reducing interest rates on the loan, extending 
the loan's term or forgiveness of principal.”  (Mamudi 2008, emphasis added). 
 
  I am not aware of the percentage used by Citigroup, or the frequency over which 
it measures borrower’s gross income for this purpose.  For the sake of illustration, 
suppose that the percentage were 25.
9  An action taken by a borrower to increase his 
income would increase his payment obligation by 25 percent of the income increment.
10  
If an affordable payment were reevaluated monthly, this would amount to a 25 percent 
                                                 
9 As a benchmark, note that FHA guidelines recommend that monthly housing payments (mortgage plus 
taxes and related payments) be less than 29% of monthly gross income and that total housing payments 
plus total debt payments be less than 41% of gross income 
(http://www.fha.com/debt_to_income_ratios.cfm). 
10 Colleges and universities also ask their customers (i.e., students) to pay tuition according to their family 
income.  It is well known that the process of collecting college tuition according to willingness to pay 
creates work disincentives.  Dick and Edlin (1997) estimated that college tuitions with annual list prices in 
the range $5,000 - $10,000 created marginal income tax rates in the range of 2 – 16 percent.  As ratios to 
potential income, these amounts seem small compared to the amounts mortgage lenders had to collect in 
the 1930s and have to collect today.  Thus, it seems quite possible that, in unusual circumstances like those, 
debt collection could create marginal tax rates in the tens of percentage points.     14
marginal tax rate over the life of the loan.  If, say, 2009 income were used to calculate an 
affordable payment for the years 2010-14 and the interest rate were 6 percent per year, 
then the marginal tax rate would be 108 percent for 2009 (4.3 times the percentage from 
the formula) and zero thereafter. 
In order to calculate an economy-wide average marginal tax rate at a point in time 
from mortgage forgiveness, the marginal tax rate for those being forgiven would have to 
be multiplied by the fraction of persons who are currently earning income to be used in 
the forgiveness formula.  I do not have the data to make such a calculation, but it seems 
that the fractions could be large enough to produce average marginal tax rates on the 
order of those shown in Figure 4 for the Great Depression. 
  My model features labor income as the only variable indicating willingness to 
repay a mortgage whose amount exceeds the value of collateral.  It is straightforward to 
modify the model include other such variables, such as asset holdings or family structure.  
Obviously, when asset holdings or family structure enter the creditor’s forgiveness 
formula, borrowers will have an incentive to seek the levels of assets and to seek the 
family structures that offer more forgiveness rather than less.  Moreover, given the long 
time dimension of loan terms and the possibility that mortgage loan forgiveness will not 
be assumable (does not stay with a home when the borrower changes residence), 
mortgage debt forgiveness may cause people to remain at a given residence longer than is 
efficient.  Yet another extension of this analysis is to property tax forgiveness. 
  Federal and state treasuries tax labor income and subsidize unemployment.  Thus, 
while forgiveness helps borrowers, creditors’ decisions to link forgiveness to borrower 
income and employment status harm those treasuries.  Governments have an incentive to 
alleviate this practice, perhaps by regulating it (governments sometimes prohibit forms of 
price discrimination), repudiating some of the debt, cutting their own taxes, or acquiring 
the debt in the marketplace and administering forgiveness themselves in a way that 
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Figure 1.  Outcomes for the Low Type
The Figure displays low type work effort (nL), repayment (TL), debt forgiveness (b-TL), and marginal 
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Figure 2.  Outcomes for the High Type
The Figure displays high type work effort (nH), repayment (TH), debt forgiveness (b-TH), and 
marginal tax rate (MTRH) as a function of the amount owed (b) in excess of collateral value0 unexpected collateral
value inflation
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Figure 3.  An Expectations-Augmented Philips Curve
The Figure displays the marginal tax rate (MTRL) as a function of
the unanticipated change in the value of collateral (-μ-b)
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